Objective The purpose is to evaluate the relationship between costs and quality and to assess whether the joint evaluation of costs and quality affects the ranking of hospital departments relative to comparison based on costs alone. Methods Using patient level data for 3,754 patients in six vascular departments, we estimate fixed effect models for costs (linear) and quality (logistic). We consider two quality measures; mortality and wound complications. To assess whether the joint evaluation of costs and quality affects the ranking of departments, we construct joint confidence regions for each pair of departmental effects for costs and quality using a bootstrap method and rank departments according to their cost-effectiveness ratio. The findings are used to evaluate a theory of a U-shaped cost/ quality relationship. Results The association between cost and quality differs depending on how quality is measured. Lower costs are associated with higher mortality, implying a cost/quality trade-off. In contrast, there is no clear association between costs and wound complications among vascular departments.
Introduction
There has been a growing interest in many countries in the benchmarking of hospitals measured on the basis of their relative costs. The majority of these studies do not take quality into account when measuring efficiency or productivity [14] .
Broadly speaking, hospital costs are driven by the complexity of the patients treated, as well as efforts to ensure cost control. The complexity of patients can be measured, at least in principle, whereas efforts to ensure cost control are unobservable. In efficiency studies, the residual cost after taking into account the types of patients treated is interpreted as insufficient effort to control costs (often labelled 'inefficiency'). But this labelling might be inaccurate because the residual cost may be capturing other unmeasured aspects of the care process. Most particularly, if hospitals choose to provide a higher level of quality this may be reflected in the residual costs and thus misinterpreted as inefficiency. The concern is that if quality is not considered or taken into account, hospitals may respond by reducing the level of quality provided. Whether this happens is a matter of controversy and depends on whether or how costs and quality are related.
More solid empirical evidence on how costs and quality are related is needed in order to achieve a better understanding of the possible implications of moving from relative efficiency as a benchmark indicator to also including quality in the objective function. Clearly, if we consider quality as a relevant output and if there is a cost/quality trade-off, we need to take quality differences into account in order to provide incentives for hospitals to produce higher levels of quality. How this should be done is not obvious. Some studies have included quality measures as additional control variables in studies analysing costs or efficiency, see for example Carey and Burgess [2] and McKay and Deily [18] . These studies are subject to the problem of potential endogeneity of quality with respect to costs, which is inherently difficult to solve. The problem with potential endogeneity is bound up with what is often referred to as the 'reverse causality' problem, i.e. that quality may also affect costs. In the current study, we avoid this problem, since we propose a method of analysing costs and quality separately. Other alternatives are discussed in Hauck and Street [13] in the more general case of having multiple objectives (among which efficiency and quality are two). They discuss three alternatives such as: analyses of the objectives in isolation, calculation of an index in which the different objectives are weighted somehow, and the use of multivariate models accounting for correlation among objectives.
This study seeks to provide new evidence on the cost/ quality relationship in hospital departments. We provide a theoretical framework for discussing the relationship between costs and quality that also underpins the identification problem. We propose a separate analysis of costs and quality, thereby avoiding the causal identification problem. We account for potential correlation between costs and quality when conducting inference on their relationship using a bootstrap procedure. Also, we address the issue of multiple criteria using cost-effectiveness as a ranking device.
Previous studies have suggested that specialty-level analysis is preferable to hospital-level analysis [12, 23] . The advantage when analysing departments instead of hospitals is that it is more likely that there is greater homogeneity in the types of patients treated as well as greater standardization in the production process [12] . Clearly, the drawback is that there are a smaller number of comparators, such as in the present study where we operate with six vascular departments only. This is an inherent drawback in many contexts, such as smaller countries where a larger number of hospitals simply cannot be realized. To overcome this, an earlier study has demonstrated that inferences among a small number of organizations can be improved by exploiting patient-level data [23] . In the present study, we have access to the same patient-level cost data as in Olsen and Street [23] . They demonstrated that it was possible to identify those departments that were statistically significantly more technically efficient than others. In the present study, we extend this analysis by exploring what effect the incorporation of quality has on the efficiency of the various departments.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss what quality measures to apply in efficiency analyses and provide an analytical framework for analysing the association between costs and quality. Second, we outline our methodological approach. Third, we describe the data available and provide some descriptives. Fourth, we estimate the departmental efforts in controlling costs and promoting good quality and rank the departments according to these effects separately for costs and quality. Fifth, we explore the relationship between costs and quality for the various departments and explore whether a joint evaluation of costs and quality alters the ranking of departments when compared to rankings based on costs or quality performance alone. Finally, a discussion and conclusion is provided.
Theoretical framework for analysing the cost/quality relationship Analysing the relationship between costs and quality based on empirical data is challenging and rather different suggestions emerge from the literature as to how costs and quality are related. A clarification of the potential relationships is called for so that studies can be evaluated. In Fig. 1 , three different relationships between costs and quality are presented based on contributions from other studies [7, 20, 30] .
The costs considered in the present theoretical (and empirical) framework are resources incurred or saved by the hospitals. Non-monetary costs and resource changes experienced in other sectors are not included in this exposition (or in the empirical analysis). The downward sloping dotted curve reflects a potential negative association between poor quality and costs. For instance, consider the relationship between adverse events (as a measure of quality) and costs. There seems to be evidence that a higher incidence of adverse events is associated with higher costs. For instance, patients suffering an adverse event tend to be hospitalized for longer. Classen et al. [3] found that the length of stay and costs of hospitalization for adverse drug events are substantial and also increased the risk of dying. Pinilla et al. [24] found that medical errors for hospitalized patients doubled the cost per patient. Plowman et al. [25] found that patients suffering wound infections are more costly to care for. Surgical complications may also increase length of stay and hospital costs [5] .
The upward sloping dashed curve reflects a potential positive relationship between investments in quality and the quality level, the expectation being that (costly) investments yield higher levels of quality. A typical example from the literature illustrating this is the association between nurse-to-patient-ratios where there is evidence that more nurses per patient is positively related to quality in terms of preventing adverse events [16] . Similarly a higher level of cleanliness may help prevent infections such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) [28] .
The U-shaped curve represents the net costs associated with different levels of quality. The net cost is the sum of costs associated with adverse events (as illustrated by the downward sloping curve) and costs invested in quality (as illustrated by the upward sloping curve). Cost of treatment is minimized when the slope of the U-shaped curve is zero. Overall quality is maximized when the preventive efforts are as high as possible. Clearly, if there is a choice between minimizing costs and maximizing quality, there is a cost/ quality trade-off. This trade-off is not evident at all levels of cost and quality. At lower levels of quality, investments aimed at improving quality may lower the net costs of treatment.
If indeed, the overall relationship between costs and quality takes the form of the U-shaped curve, it is not surprising that there is a lack of empirical consensus about whether the relationship between costs and quality is negative. The empirical results depend on where hospitals lie along the U-shaped curve, and their position will vary from study to study and, perhaps, according to how quality is measured. Some studies have found a positive association between costs and quality, suggesting a cost/quality trade-off as illustrated by the upward sloping part of the U-shaped curve in Fig. 1 . Others have found a negative association, suggesting that there may be some degree of complementarity and that cost containment and health improvement are compatible goals. Dismuke and Sena [6] and Sola and Prior [32] found that it is possible to improve efficiency while at the same time reducing in-hospital mortality [6] or percentage of nosocomial infections [27] . Nayar and Ozcan [22] found that efficient hospitals were also efficient in producing quality. Likewise, a study by Laine et al. [15] found that low quality may be associated with inefficiency. A study by Carey and Burgess [2] measured quality in terms of mortality and found a positive association between costs and quality because patients who die are more costly to care for. Maniadakis et al. [17] found that when incorporating quality the magnitude of the productivity changes diminish suggesting that to some extent gains in productivity may be at the expense of gains in the level of quality. Morey et al. [21] found that a 1 percent decrease in the ratio of observed to predicted deaths was associated with a 1.34 percent increase in efficient cost. Clement et al. [4] found that poorer patient outcomes in terms of mortality were associated with lower efficiency. Other studies have found the cost/quality relationship to be more complex as it changes over the range of quality and depends on the outcome measure employed or how quality is incorporated [8, 9, 19, 26, 35] .
Some have argued that higher quality will cost more and that with limited budgets, hospital departments might try to contain costs or reduce unit costs by cutting the resources needed for various services, which is likely to result in poorer quality of care and outcomes. A contrasting argument is that inefficient use of resources may reflect poor management, which is also likely to be associated with poor quality of care. Thus, some hospitals or hospital departments may be operating on the downward sloping part of the U-shaped curve, where further investments in preventing poor quality may reduce costs as well as improve quality. This is the case if hospitals manage to eliminate wasteful costs such as those resulting from poor quality. Others may be operating on the upward sloping part where further investments may improve quality, thus reflecting a cost/quality trade-off. Our hypothesis is that the association between net costs and quality may differ among departments. This is what we seek to explore in the present study in order to examine what effect inclusion of quality in the performance criteria may have on the relative performance of hospital departments.
Materials and methods

Methods
We seek to investigate whether including quality by jointly evaluating costs and quality alters the ranking of hospitals departments based on separate analysis of costs or quality. In these rankings, departmental performance is assessed after controlling for differences in the types of patients treated as a form of risk adjustment. This section describes how the risk adjustment is performed, how costs and quality are separately and jointly analysed, and how rankings are constructed.
Construction of cost and quality performance measures
Following earlier literature [23, 34] , we construct the cost and quality performance measures by specifying fixed effects models to analyse the costs and quality of care delivered to individual patients, recognizing that department in which they are treated. Our model analysing costs is defined as:
where c ij is the cost of patient i in department j. X ij is a vector with risk adjustment factors to be specified below. These risk adjustment factors are chosen to describe the department case-mix. The model has a department specific constant (a fixed effect), a j , containing unobserved average characteristics of patients and characteristics of the department in which the patient was treated, and which, without loss of generalization is normalized to sum to zero. The error term v ij captures unobserved characteristics of individual patients [26] . It is the department specific constant that we interpret as the risk-adjusted costs and we refer to it as the ''departmental effect''. When the number of departments is small, the departmental effect can be estimated by the LSDV estimator obtained as OLS estimates of (1) with dummies for each department included as regressors. Given the LSDV estimates of a and b, one can write the LSDV estimates of a j as:
This is an unbiased estimate of the true but unknown department effect provided that risk adjustment factors are strongly exogenous (e.g. Wooldridge [36] ):
where top bars denote empirical means, here across patients within department j. Given the exogeneity assumption, we can also formally define department effects more generally as the difference between observed department costs and expected department costs, where expectation is formed using only risk adjustment factors but no department information:
The department effect is positive if departments have higher costs than expected and negative if departments have lower costs than expected. Note that using a fixed effect, specification has two clear advantages compared to a random effects estimator: (1) It provides explicit estimates of the department effects for the given departments of interest and (2) It is unbiased even if risk adjustment factors, X, and the departmental effects a j are correlated. Such a correlation may arise if departments are acting upon knowledge of risk adjustment factors, which in our view seems realistic. Moreover, the fixed effects correspond to stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) estimates of inefficiency (after subtracting the minimum fixed effect), see for example Wagstaff [29] and Schmidt and Sickles [34] . Compared to cross-sectional estimates of SFA models, no distributional assumptions are needed.
The interpretation and properties of the fixed effect estimates hinges crucially, however, on what is in the conditioning set X, the risk adjustment factors. The risk adjustment factors should, we believe, be factors that influence costs and quality, but which are beyond the control of the department. There is no clear-cut agreement on which variables qualify as 'acceptable' risk adjustment factors. This resembles the problems of adjustments made in the social choice literature on fair compensation, needs adjustment in inequity measurement, and risk adjustment in the insurance literature, see for example Gravelle [10] or Schokkaert and Van de Voorde [31] . Here, we define risk adjustment factors to be mainly pre-hospitalization patient characteristics listed in Table 1 (i.e. department case-mix). Factors within the control (in principle at least) of the departments such as length of stay, use of specific procedures, the amount of staff per patient are considered to be endogenous and therefore not applied as controls in the models. As such, (1) can be viewed as a reduced form equation. Having specified the risk adjustment factors, it should be noted that while the departmental effect in part reflects the various departments' ability in controlling costs for their patients after taking into account the types of patients treated, they also absorb any unobserved differences in patient characteristics that may vary systematically between departments. Note that provider characteristics cannot be included as risk adjustment factors because they do not vary across patients in the same department and are absorbed by the fixed effect. The departmental effects, therefore, also reflect differences in provider characteristics. Some of these might be exogenous, at least in the short run, such as whether the department is specialized or non-specialized.
Risk adjustment for quality outcomes follows the same line of overall reasoning as for costs. We could specify a linear fixed effect model just as for costs, but given that the quality measures we consider are binomial and therefore the mean outcome is non-linearly related to risk adjustment factors by construction, this would provide biased risk Exploring the relationship between costs and quality 545 adjustments. We therefore specify a logistic regression model for quality outcomes:
where q ij is the quality outcome for patient i in department j and 1() is the indicator function. X is the same vector of risk adjustment factors as for costs, see Table 1 . c j is a department specific constant, and the error term e ij captures the unexplained variation in patient quality. We assume that the errors are logistically distributed, so that the model becomes a logit model:
The c j are departmental quality effects in the same sense as a j are departmental cost effects in the cost equations. Note that they are measured on a logistic scale, so for ease of interpretation we instead define the departmental quality effect as the difference between observed and expected quality, where expectation is taken with respect to observed patient characteristics. This also provides a risk adjustment that follows the more general definition provided in (4). As the overall mean predicted quality does not correspond to overall mean observed quality in logistic models, we adjust the effect to ensure that the departmental quality effect is still measured relatively to an overall zero mean. If q is an indicator of good quality, we define our departmental quality effect as (and with opposite sign if q is an indicator of poor quality):
The last terms in the squared parenthesis is the adjustment to ensure an overall zero mean. Note that it is just a constant subtracted from all department estimates.
Joint evaluation of costs and quality
In order to rank the departments on the basis of information on quality and costs, we calculate a cost/quality ratio similar to what is done in a cost-effectiveness analysis. This involves dividing the departmental effect for costs with the departmental effect for the quality measure for each department. This exercise is equivalent to ranking the departments according to their average cost per unit of quality. However, in the current study, we only use this two-dimensional performance indicator to rank the departments and do not assume that there is an underlying simple causal relationship between costs and quality for all quality dimensions.
If a department provides above average quality, a high degree of cost-effectiveness requires that the added quality is obtained at the lowest possible excess costs. In contrast, for those departments providing below average quality it would require that they compensate by higher cost savings in order to obtain the same cost/quality ratio as a department with above average quality. In this way, the two departments may obtain the same cost/quality ratio and be equally cost effective.
By plotting the departmental effects into a diagram according to the department's cost performance (on the y-axis) and quality performance (on the x-axis), we get something that is analogous to a cost-effectiveness plane, since it provides us with four quadrants. We are able to place each department in one of four quadrants (Figs. 2, 3) . First, we have the north-eastern quadrant where quality is above average and where the quality is obtained at higher than average costs. Second, we have the south-western quadrant where departments provide lower than average quality but at lower than average cost. Third, there is the south-eastern quadrant where departments provide higher quality at lower than average cost. Fourth, the north-western quadrant where departments provide below average quality at higher than average cost.
To assess whether the joint evaluation of costs and quality affects the ranking between departments significantly, we construct joint confidence regions for each pair of departmental effects for costs and quality. We use a likelihood-based method to construct the confidence region, where the joint likelihood of costs and quality are estimated by a non-parametric kernel density on bootstrap Fig. 2 Difference between observed and expected cost (DKK) per patient, and difference between expected and observed mortality within 30 days per patient and 95% confidence regions, by department (differences between observed and expected costs, and expected and observed risk of dying per patient corresponds to the departmental effects for costs and quality respectively) samples of cost and quality departmental effects [11] . 1 We use non-parametric bootstrapping with replacement within department strata and we use 10,000 bootstrap samples. Quality and cost samples are parallel selected implying that a potential covariance between costs and the quality measure is taken into account, without assuming joint normality of costs and quality. When comparing costs and quality among hospital departments, we rely on the confidence intervals and a 5% significance level.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data were available for all patients admitted for vascular surgery (3,754 patients) in six (out of eight) 2 vascular departments from six different hospitals in Denmark in 2004.
Data on wound complications and patient characteristics are drawn from The Danish Vascular Registry, which is a national (clinical) registry for quality measures and detailed patient characteristics for all vascular hospital departments in Denmark [33] . The Danish Vascular Registry was established by the Danish Vascular Society and contains information on patient specific characteristics such as age, gender, smoking status, disease status (including previous diseases) and surgical information. The main purpose of the Danish Vascular Registry is to monitor quality of care. Data on 30 days mortality are drawn from The Causes of Death Registry.
The cost data were taken from the National Cost database and cover the resources used during admission for intensive care, laboratory tests, procedures, ward stays etc. The National Cost Database is based on patient-level data reported by each hospital according to accounting guidelines set out by the National Board of Health and, for ancillary services, by applying a national set of relative service weights. The National Cost Database is the basis of the Danish case-mix system DkDRG, under which hospitals are reimbursed [1] . Table 1 describes the variables applied in the analysis and provides basic descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole. Also, some characteristics describing the hospitals are provided.
Results
Ranking according to costs
In Table 2 , the results from a fixed effect cost model (Eq. 1) are presented. The departmental effects can be interpreted as departmental performance in exerting cost control after taking into account the types of patients treated. The estimates for each department reflect the deviation from the overall expected mean. A departmental effect below zero means that the department has lower costs than expected given the types of patients treated and vice versa for a departmental effect above zero.
The departments can be sorted into three groups. Three departments (B, A and C) have negative departmental effects (lower costs than the overall expected mean given the patients they treat), one department has an average departmental effect (D) (with confidence intervals crossing The departmental effects are calculated as regression post-estimation in intercooled stata 9.2) [95% CI] (* if significant at 5%) a The results for the covariates (listed in Table 1 ) have the expected sign. The full set of results is not shown but can be obtained upon request to the authors Fig. 3 Difference between observed and expected cost (DKK) per patient, and difference between expected and observed risk of suffering wound complications per patient and 95% confidence regions, by department 1 We use a Gaussian kernel and experiment with different bandwidths. The plots shown have bandwidths of one standard deviation for costs and quality. Similar results are obtained with half or twice the size of these bandwidths. 2 The remaining two departments were excluded because they did not provide complete cost data.
Exploring the relationship between costs and quality 547 zero) and two departments exhibit positive departmental effects (E and F).
Ranking according to quality
In Table 3 , the results from the fixed effect quality model (Eq. 6) are presented for the two quality measures applied along with 95% confidence intervals. The departments are ranked according to their departmental effect with the first listed performing best for the specific quality measure. The departmental effects can be interpreted as deviation in risk of dying or suffering wound complications from overall expected mean. A departmental effect above zero can be interpreted as indicative of good departmental performance since the department has a higher level of quality than expected given the patients it treats. The departments perform quite differently according to the quality measure applied. For example, department A ranks highest according to mortality and lowest according to wound complications. Department B ranks lowest according to mortality and second highest according to wound complications.
Ranking according to cost-effectiveness
We illustrate the relationship between departmental costs and mortality (Fig. 2) or wound complications (Fig. 3) , respectively. It is apparent that the departments are placed in different quadrants suggesting that they perform quite differently across these dimensions. The confidence regions, as depicted by the ellipses, suggest that statistically significant differences in performance are less prevalent when performance is measured in terms of costs and quality rather than costs alone. Figure 2 shows that five out of the six departments are placed in one of the two trade-off quadrants, where lower costs are associated with lower quality (SW quadrant) or higher costs are associated with higher quality (NE quadrant). Overall, then, one may cautiously suggest that there appears to be a cost/quality trade-off for costs and mortality. Figure 3 , however, shows that this conclusion is sensitive to the quality measure. When quality is measured by wound complications rather than mortality, departments appear in all four quadrants.
In Table 4 , we list the ranking of departments when these are benchmarked according to cost, quality and costeffectiveness, respectively. We interpret the relative cost effectiveness from Figs. 2 and 3 in the following way; Departments placed in the south-eastern quadrant are ranked as the most cost-effective departments (with those departments exhibiting a steeper slope relative to the origin being the most cost effective). Departments placed in the south-western or the north-eastern quadrants follow in relative cost-effectiveness. Finally, those departments which are to be found in the north-western quadrant exhibit the lowest cost effectiveness with those placed more steeply relative to the origin demonstrating the worst cost effectiveness ratio.
From Table 4 , we see that choice of performance indicator has implications for the ranking of departments. If 
benchmarking focuses on cost minimization, department B is ranked highest (column 1). But risk-adjusted mortality is highest in this department (column 2). If one also takes into account how this department performs with respect to costs and mortality, department B ranks number three in terms of cost effectiveness (column 3). Similarly, department A moves from being ranked the lowest when the focus is wound complications (column 4), whereas the department is ranked third when costs and wound complications are analysed jointly (column 5).
Discussion
We compare rankings of departments with and without consideration of quality aspects. The joint evaluation of both costs and quality follows the spirit from [13] by analyzing two objectives separately, without the need to specify relative weights on the objectives or to address their causal relation. Further we suggest ranking departments according to their cost-effectiveness and thus deliver a univariate assessment criterion from the pair of objectives.
We also suggest procedures of inference that take a correlation between costs and quality into account. A potential drawback of the separate estimation of cost and quality is that estimated equations might suffer from omitted variable bias. How to address this without a solid strategy for solving the causal identification problem is not obvious.
When departments are ranked according to cost-effectiveness rather than cost minimization (or quality maximization), it produces a different ordering of departments. There do not appear to be systematic differences in the ordering according to hospital characteristics (listed in Table 1 ) although when considering costs alone there is a tendency for better performance for non-specialized hospitals and lower performance for specialized hospitals. Due to a large degree of statistical uncertainty surrounding mortality and wound complications (the latter to a lesser extent), the ranking is not consistently based on statistically significant differences in cost effectiveness. It should, however, be acknowledged that ranking according to relative cost-effectiveness implies that the aim is to minimize the cost per unit of quality produced. In the case that other objectives are pursued, cost effectiveness is not the right assessment criteria. Moreover, if higher levels of quality are associated with higher marginal costs (an assumption which is not confirmed by our study) and assuming there is a societal willingness to pay such a higher price, this simple cost effectiveness criterion would be invalid. In that case, plots of the two performance measures against each other may still provide useful information to decision makers. It should be stressed that as a benchmark tool, the analysis described here can be conducted without prior knowledge or assumptions about an underlying causal relationship.
Yet the causal cost/quality relationship conjectured as a U shape can be evaluated from our findings. We believe that with respect to the association between (net) costs and mortality we have found some indication of a cost/quality trade-off, suggesting that higher quality may come at a higher cost. This is based on the observation that the relative placing of departments B to F in the quadrants of Fig. 2 is indicative of such a relationship (the exception being department A). Intuitively, this is plausible if the easy-to-implement and less expensive interventions aimed at reducing mortality have already been introduced across all departments, leaving the harder-to-implement and more expensive interventions as the only means of reducing mortality further. If so the variation in costs and mortality rates across the hospital departments reflect a level of variation that places them on the right-hand side of Fig. 1 , and thus on the part of the U-shaped curve where higher quality is more costly. This conclusion is, however, drawn with some reservation, since A is an outlier. This may be because other unobserved factors (i.e. good leadership) and not only resource investments play a significant role in obtaining high levels of quality. It should be stressed that this interpretation of our findings has not addressed the endogeneity issues directly but follows under the assumptions of a common theoretical U-shaped cost/quality curve.
With respect to the relationship between costs and wound complications, we found no systematic pattern, and no indication of a U-shaped curve as a good description of the relationship between cost and quality. Whereas departments D and F (in the north-western quadrant) and department E (in the north-eastern quadrant) could represent departments which have not yet invested in quality (D and F) and a department (E) which has reached a phase where only expensive investments can reduce wound infections further, the story does not fit the placement of departments A, B and C. These departments have markedly lower cost levels, and departments B and C demonstrate higher levels of quality. The resulting image of a cost/ quality relationship is almost that of an inverse U-shape, suggesting that our theoretical framework of how resource use and quality may interplay cannot explain these observations.
We have employed two measures of quality in this study and found no common relationship with costs. However, the measures applied are rare events and affect only few patients. It would have been valuable with measures that apply to all or a wider number of patients. Other measures of quality have been proposed, including measures of health outcome such as quality-adjusted life years. Were such data to be available it would be instructive to apply our approach to analysing the nature of the relationship between these measures and costs.
We have interpreted the departmental effects as the departments' ability in promoting good quality and cost control for their patients after taking into account the types of patients treated. However, it cannot be ruled out that the departmental effect partly captures unobserved patient characteristics and other factors beyond the control of the department or long-run provider characteristics that ideally should be controlled for. So even though we have controlled for a large number of patient characteristics in our analyses, there may be further explanations outside the managerial influence that we have been unable to account for due to lack of data, such as differences in environmental circumstances. For instance, departments may have higher costs if they have difficultly discharging patients because primary or community care is relatively underdeveloped in their vicinity.
A further limitation of our study is that our results are based on observations of six departments only (due to limited number of vascular departments in Denmark). This limits the generalizability of our analysis. Having few departmental observations is often bound to be an unavoidable constraint that the analyst must accept when seeking to analyse such relationships. This is especially the case in a small country like Denmark, where the number of departments within a specialty often includes as few as five to seven departments. We have, however, attempted to take this problem into account by applying a bootstrap method enabling us to consider uncertainty when calculating average departmental effects.
Conclusion
Our study demonstrates that an implication of taking quality into account when comparing efficiency is that it alters the ranking of the departments. For mortality, a cautious conclusion is that there is a cost/quality trade-off, implying that taking quality into account may offer some explanation of differences in efficiency. For wound complication, however, there does not appear to be a systematic pattern of association between costs and quality for either low-or high-performing departments. This suggests that, in our study, consideration of quality in terms of wound complication is somewhat inconclusive as to how it affects efficiency. Of course more research into this rather complex interaction between efficiency and quality performance is needed before it is possible to draw general conclusions as to the relationship between costs and quality. We have set out a framework for evaluating this relationship and devised an empirical strategy that can be employed even when the analyst is faced with a small number of hospital departments and also without the knowledge of underlying causal relationships. Compared to benchmarking of departments based solely on their costs, we have seen that the ranking of departments may be altered considerably when quality is taken into account. This lends further support to having a well-rounded view of departmental objectives when undertaking performance evaluation.
